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Abstract 
Over the past four decades, the accumulation of policy legacies and public debt has led 
to a decline in fiscal flexibility in Germany and the United States. By applying an index 
of fiscal democracy to Germany, the paper illustrates the associated shrinkage of demo­
cratic control over budget priorities and compares the developments in both countries.
Zusammenfassung
In den vergangenen vier Jahrzehnten hat die Anhäufung politischer Erblasten und öffent­
licher Verschuldung sowohl in Deutschland als auch in den USA zu einer Abnahme fis­
kalischer Flexibilität geführt. Anhand eines Fiscal Democracy Index für Deutschland 
schildert der Aufsatz die damit einhergehende Verringerung demokratischer Kontrolle 
budgetärer Prioritäten und vergleicht die Entwicklungen in beiden Ländern.
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The idea is not new that “policy legacies” may accumulate over time, constraining the 
choices of elected governments and parliaments and diminishing the capacity of states 
to respond to emerging social problems (Pierson 1998, 2001; Rose 1990; Rose/Davies 
1994; Rose/Karran 1987). Not only is it hard to abolish spending programs even after 
they have outlived their original purpose, but often programs have built­in mechanisms 
that incrementally increase the cost – following the logic of compound interest – far 
beyond what was expected at the time of their inception. This holds in particular for 
so­called pay­as­you­go social security programs that become more costly as they “ma­
ture” in time, i.e., as the number of claimants entitled to benefits increases, and average 
benefits increase with the number of years of enrollment (Pierson 2001).
Since the late 1970s, the problem of accumulating policy legacies has been a prominent 
theme in the literature on public finance. In addition to the high survival rate of politi­
cal programs and the quasi­automatic increase in social security and other entitlement 
spending, the chronic budget deficits of most democratic states and the resulting rise 
in public debt have significantly limited the degrees of freedom left to governments 
in the deployment of scarce fiscal means. Democratic states in particular seem to be 
under strong pressure to manage distributional conflict in their societies and political 
economies by augmenting available resources through borrowing from the future. As 
a result, public debt increases, as does the yearly interest on the public debt. Like the 
mounting costs of inherited programs and maturing entitlements, debt service is thus 
likely to consume a rising share of tax revenue, and thereby gradually fill the fiscal space 
for policy innovation and increasingly preempt democratic choice.1
Accumulation of policy legacies may be conceived as a process of institutional sclerosis 
(Olson 1982) or institutional aging (Streeck 2009). The concepts introduce time as a 
causal factor in the analysis of institutional change, raising the possibility, for example, 
that the longer a democratic political system has existed, the less flexible it will be with 
respect to the allocation of its available resources. From this perspective, a wide variety 
of themes comes into view. Among other things, it may be hypothesized that tax in­
creases, which would temporarily suspend institutional aging, will be the more difficult 
to achieve in a democracy the further the aging process has already progressed. The 
reason is that a tax increase that is used in full or in part to service or pay off the public 
debt does not directly benefit those who must agree to it. Sclerotic foreclosure of policy 
innovation over time may in this way become self­reinforcing and eventually under­
mine the viability of democratic politics as such.2
1 For a concise formulation of the problem, see Stiglitz’s account of the policies of the first Clin­
ton administration which took office in 1993: “That the deficits were not sustainable in the long 
run was clear … With a growing debt, the federal government had to pay higher and higher 
interest rates, and with higher interest rates and more debt, more and more money simply went 
to pay interest on the national debt. These interest payments would eventually crowd out other 
forms of expenditure …” (Stiglitz 2003: 35–36)
2 On self­undermining institutions, see Greif (2006) and Greif and Latin (2004).
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1 Indexing fiscal democracy
From the perspective of a sitting government or legislature, accumulated policy legacies 
that occupy a large share of the state’s tax revenue pose a problem of “fiscal democ­
racy”: they leave little to decide in the present because much has already been decided 
in the past. Since fiscal democracy is essentially about the flexibility of fiscal resources, 
it is possible to measure it by the proportion of tax revenue that is not needed to cover 
obligations entered into in the past – that is, the proportion of tax revenue available 
in principle to be allocated to newly chosen, current purposes. This is roughly the way 
in which Eugene Steuerle and Timothy Roeper have constructed their Steuerle­Roeper 
Fiscal Democracy Index, which was presented in early 2010 in an article on the op­ed 
page of the newspaper USA Today (Steuerle 2010).3 Among other things, the index has 
the advantage that it defines fiscal democracy in gradual­numerical terms – one can 
have more or less of it – and in a way that makes its development traceable over longer 
periods, as it can easily be built into a time series. In the following, we will briefly de­
scribe the construction of the Steuerle­Roeper index for the United States and discuss 
what it tells us about the trajectory of “fiscal democracy” in the past four decades in the 
leading Western nation. Following this, we will present a similar index for Germany and 
use it to compare the German situation to the American one.4
The fundamental distinction underlying the Steuerle­Roeper index is between dedi­
cated and disposable, or mandatory and discretionary, government spending.5 It is rela­
tively straightforward to operationalize for the United States, where only discretionary 
budget allocations are voted upon by the Congress and are on this basis easy to identify 
as such. Mandatory expenditure is not voted on because it is considered to be driven 
by events beyond the volition of legislators, in particular the incidence of social secu­
rity or unemployment insurance claims, or the costs of medical care under the federal 
health care programs, Medicare and Medicaid. Mandatory programs create legal en­
titlements on the part of citizens to benefits that cannot be refused or reduced as long 
as the entitlements exist. Of course, Congress may cut entitlements, such as pensions, 
and thereby reduce mandatory spending. To do this, however, it must rewrite spend­
ing laws, instead of simply cutting or placing a ceiling on budgetary allocations.6 Like 
3 See also Steuerle and Rennane (2010).
4 We are grateful to Gene Steuerle and Stephanie Rennane for letting us have the latest version 
(February 24, 2010) of their fiscal data and allowing us to use it for our calculations.
5 “It is an index of how much ‘give’ or ‘slack’ or ‘flexibility’ there is in the budget or how much 
‘dead men rule’” (personal communication from Eugene C. Steuerle, February 11, 2010).
6 “Mandatory programs are those that make payments every year regardless of any action by the 
legislature, whereas other programs must be appropriated each year. The complication politi­
cally is that mandatory programs require positive action to be slowed down, whereas discre­
tionary programs require positive action to be increased. In other words, mandatory programs 
are favored over discretionary ones. At a more complicated level, many mandatory programs 
grow automatically, then in political language a slowdown in their growth rate is called a ‘cut,’ 
whereas an increase in discretionary programs, even just to compensate for inflation, is called 
an ‘increase’” (personal communication from Eugene C. Steuerle, February 11, 2010).
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entitlement programs, debt service is considered mandatory spending since the interest 
due to creditors represents a legal entitlement that cannot unilaterally be reduced by 
the Congress. Defense spending, however, is considered discretionary as it is voted on 
every year. Discretionary spending – what is left of government revenue after manda­
tory spending and debt service – is expressed in terms of government revenue, rather 
than government spending, in order not to distort the measure of fiscal democracy by 
including new debt in its base.7
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the trend in fiscal democracy in the United States 
has been downward, from 60 percent in 1970 to a little less than zero percent in 2009 
(Figure 1).8  There were four cyclical upswings between 1970 and 2009; the strongest oc­
7 The formula for the index, then, is “1 – [(mandatory spending + interest)/revenues], multiplied 
by 100 for conversion to a percentage.” The index “falls when revenues are reduced without 
cutting mandatory spending, and it is reduced when mandatory spending is increased without 
increasing revenues” and is therefore “neutral on the size of government” (personal communi­
cation from Eugene C. Steuerle, February 11, 2010).
8 Meaning that, in the year after the beginning of the current “financial crisis,” mandatory ex­
penses including interest payments exceeded total government income. This was caused by a 
simultaneous decline in revenue and a rapid increase in mandatory spending. As a result, all 
discretionary spending, including military expenditure, had to be debt­financed.
Figure 1 Steuerle-Roeper Fiscal Democracy Index, United States, 1970–2020
Source: Rennane/Roeper/Steuerle (2010); based on historical data from the Office of Management 
and Budget and 2010 Congressional Budget Office projections. Excludes TARP spending.
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curred in the period between 1992 and 2000 – the “Clinton prosperity” – when revenue 
doubled while interest payments stagnated as a result of falling interest rates. Subse­
quent economic downturns, however, always ended with a new record low, except once 
(2000–2003). The current crisis has critically exacerbated the problem, but essentially it 
has done nothing but accelerate a process that has long been under way. Projections for 
the coming decade by the Congressional Budget Office (included in Figure 1) foresee a 
slight increase in fiscal discretion until 2013; thereafter, the index is seen to fall and turn 
negative again.
There is little ambiguity in this condition. “As the amount we can spend on the new and 
unforeseen shrinks,” writes Steuerle (2010), 
so does each generation’s democratic control of social and economic priorities … For the first time 
in U.S. history, in 2009 every single dollar of revenue was committed before Congress voted on any 
spending program. Meanwhile, most of government’s basic functions – from justice to education 
to turning on the lights in the Capitol – are paid for out of swelling, unsustainable debts.
2 A Fiscal Democracy Index for Germany
Applying the Steuerle­Roeper index to Germany requires a few operational adjustments 
where legal definitions, parliamentary procedures, and political circumstances differ. 
It seems, however, entirely feasible. First, a problem arises in applying the concept of 
“mandatory spending” to the German situation. Unlike the United States, the German 
legislature votes every year on the entire budget, and in this respect, there is no formal 
distinction between discretionary and mandatory spending. However, there are at least 
four categories in the German federal budget, in addition to interest payments, that are 
de facto mandatory, in the sense that the government is legally obliged to pay for them. 
While the parliament inserts the required amounts in the budget, as estimated by the 
Ministry of Finance, and in this way appropriates them, like in the United States, the 
only alternative for it doing so would be to change the respective entitlement legislation. 
For the period beginning in 1970, the four categories are:
(1) The so­called Kriegsfolgelasten stemming from World War II. This refers to obliga­
tions resulting from the war, including reparations and payments to victims of the 
Nazi regime. In 1970 this category still amounted to roughly ten percent of the 
federal budget. In subsequent decades it continuously declined and has now almost 
disappeared.
(2) Personnel. Under German labor law it is not possible for the government unilater­
ally to cut or withhold pay to its employees, even if the legislature were to refuse 
allocating sufficient funds. Spending on personnel is essentially determined by ap­
plicable collective agreements that bind the state as employer.
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(3)  Subsidies to the (parafiscal) social security funds. Under German law, the federal 
government is obliged to cover whatever deficits may arise in the social security 
system (which is funded by a payroll tax outside the federal budget). By now about 
one third of federal spending is devoted to subsidizing social security.
(4)  Long­term unemployment benefits (Sozialhilfe, Grundsicherung). These are legal 
entitlements of individuals meant to guarantee them a minimum level of subsis­
tence. The benefits are defined by the legislature, but its decisions are in part subject 
to review by the Constitutional Court.
As all four of the above spending categories are “given” unless the legal entitlements of 
their beneficiaries are specifically changed, we treat them as mandatory in the American 
sense. Together with the government’s expenditure on debt service, they constitute the 
dedicated part of government spending, as distinguished from the discretionary part.
Another problem relates to defense. Formally, defense expenditures are discretionary, 
and there is nobody “entitled” to being paid out of the defense budget (except, of course, 
the military personnel as protected by German labor law). In substance, however, the 
German military is in its entirety under the command of NATO, and the German de­
fense budget is set to complement NATO and, even more so, U.S. spending. Unlike the 
United States, Germany has no enemies, no client governments to protect, no specific 
military objectives, and no strategic doctrine of its own. We have, for this reason, calcu­
lated the German index twice, counting defense expenditures in one case as discretion­
ary, in line with American practice, and in the other as effectively beyond the control of 
the German legislature, and in this sense as mandatory. In the latter case, the resulting 
index measures the share of government revenues available for discretionary spending 
on domestic purposes only.
Even more than in the United States, fiscal democracy in Germany, as measured by the 
index, has been declining since the 1970s (Figure 2). Specifically, more or less steadily 
growing spending to support the social security system and on social assistance for the 
long­term unemployed, and also but less so on interest9, has over almost for decades 
steadily narrowed the political choices of German governments. Spending on defense 
has declined, however, particularly in the years immediately after the end of the Cold 
War. In Figure 2, this is reflected over time in the shrinking distance between the two 
lines – the upper, broken one treating defense as discretionary and the lower, solid one 
treating it as mandatory. The diagram also shows that, in the early 1990s when the larg­
est part of the post­1989 “peace dividend” accrued, fiscal discretion with respect to do­
mestic spending recovered for a few years, albeit to continue its decline after 1995. The 
subsequent increase ten years later was owed to the consolidation effort of the “Grand 
Coalition” government (Merkel I), while the steep decline that followed after 2008 – 
9 As can be seen in all other countries of the developed world, historically low interest rates since 
the 1990s have significantly lowered the cost of debt service in the last one­and­a­half decades.
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which will continue for at least another two years – represents the fiscal effects of the 
current crisis of the global financial system.10
When comparing Germany to the United States, there is yet another conceptual prob­
lem, which results from the different ways the two countries finance their social secu­
rity systems. In the United States, social security contributions are collected as payroll 
taxes by the federal government, whereas in Germany they do not appear in the federal 
budget at all. Although they are taxes for all practical and economic purposes, German 
social security contributions are paid to and administered by four types of parafiscal 
funds: one each for old age pensions, health care, unemployment insurance, and care 
for the elderly. Together, the four branches of the social security system collect contri­
butions amounting to about 40 percent of the real wage, up to an indexed cutoff point 
beyond which individuals are exempt from paying.
10 Under the balanced budget constitutional amendment of 2009, the German federal government 
is under a legal obligation to eliminate budget deficits by 2016. It has also committed itself to 
lower taxes. Things being the way they are, this must mean a further reduction in discretionary 
spending because federal subsidies to social security, social assistance, and interest payments 
are bound to increase further, and spending on personnel and defense are fixed for all practical 
purposes.
Figure 2 Fiscal Democracy Index, Germany, 1970–2009: Federal government revenue
Discretionary expenditure including defense 
Domestic discretionary expenditure
Source: Bundesfinanzberichte 1975–2010; own calculations.
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To increase comparability with the United States, we have, in a further version of the 
Fiscal Democracy Index, added social security contributions to federal government rev­
enues, as though not only the latter but also the former were collected by the state and 
included in the state budget. The sum of the two, representing the sum total of public 
revenues at the national level, is used as the denominator of the revised index. In the 
numerator, we have added the total expenditure of the four branches of the social se­
curity system to the federal government’s mandatory expenditure, given that the entire 
expenditure of the social security system is, by definition, mandatory. Because an exact 
accounting of total expenditure for all four branches of the social security system is 
hard to come by, we have used as a proxy the sum total of social security contributions, 
which under the pay­as­you­go logic of the German welfare state are almost completely 
spent in the same year that they are collected.
Since the terms added to the numerator and to the denominator are the same, the effect 
is that the absolute value of the index declines (Figure 3). This is as it should be, given 
the fact that social security contributions are entirely dedicated to a pre­established 
purpose and are not available for discretionary re­allocation. The extent of the decline 
reflects the magnitude of the social security contributions collected by the parafiscal 
institutions of the welfare state in relation to government revenues proper. Over time 
200
7
Figure 3 Fiscal Democracy Index, Germany, 1970–2008: Federal government  
 revenue and social security contributions
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Source: Bundesfinanzberichte 1975–2010, Statistisches Bundesamt; own calculations.
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the revised index follows basically the same path as the index based on the revenues of 
the federal government alone, apart from the fact that, due to a relative increase of so­
cial security contributions compared to federal taxes during the period in question, the 
decline in overall fiscal discretion is (even) steeper. Since the figures on social security 
contributions collected in 2009 were not yet in at the time of writing, the effect of the 
financial crisis is not yet visible in Figure 3. However, there can be no doubt that the 
crisis has further and dramatically reduced fiscal discretion.
Figure 4 Fiscal democracy, United States and Germany, 1970–2009
Source: Bundesfinanzberichte 1975–2010, Statistisches Bundesamt, Rennane/Roeper/Steuerle (2010); 
own calculations.
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3 The United States and Germany compared
In both countries, Germany and the United States, fiscal democracy has steeply declined 
since the early 1970s (Figure 4). Moreover, the global financial crisis that began in 2008 
has undone any gains in fiscal democracy made in the late 1990s (United States) and the 
mid­2000s (United States and Germany). In effect, the crisis seems about to eliminate 
almost completely any space for fiscal discretion in the foreseeable future unless govern­
ments are willing, and able economically and legally, to take up new, additional debt.
Until the mid­1980s, fiscal discretion in the United States declined more sharply than in 
Germany, caused mainly by rapidly rising interest payments. In the 1990s, by contrast, 
it recovered faster because of economic growth and the budget­balancing policies of 
the Clinton administration. That the index is more volatile in the United States than in 
Germany is explained not just by the generally more cyclical nature of the U.S. economy, 
but also by the greater importance in the United States of defense spending as com­
pared to social security spending.
4 Welfare state, warfare state
The importance of military spending in the United States is also revealed by comparing 
two versions of the Fiscal Democracy Index, one that considers defense as discretionary 
and another that, as is more realistic in the German case, treats it as non­discretionary 
(Figure 5). In the United States, the difference between the two versions is far greater 
than in Germany, and fiscal democracy is vastly diminished if defense spending is seen 
not as freely chosen but, as in Germany, imposed by the outside world. 11
Testifying to the different priorities of the American state as compared to a European 
welfare state, the index of fiscal democracy turns negative already under Reagan in the 
early 1980s if defense is classified as non­discretionary. After a brief recovery it ap­
proached zero again in the wake of September 11, 2001, and fell to a staggering –40 
percent in 2010 – which means that in that year entitlements, interest payments and 
the costs of the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan together exceeded federal revenues by 
roughly one half.
11 Note that, in American public discourse, defense spending is considered as essentially invol­
untary, as it is perceived to be imposed on the country by its enemies. All parties agree that 
America must spend on national security whatever it believes it takes, without regard to fiscal 
or economic constraints, since national security is regarded as the uppermost political objective. 
There is no difference in this respect between the administrations of Bush and Obama.
14 MPIfG Working Paper 10/3
–40
–20
0
20
40
60
80
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Source: Rennane/Roeper/Steuerle (2010); own calculations.
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Im Mittelpunkt steht die Untersuchung der Zu-
 sammen hänge zwischen ökonomischem, sozialem 
und politischem Handeln. Mit einem vornehmlich 
institutionellen Ansatz wird erforscht, wie Märkte 
und Wirtschaftsorganisationen in historisch-institu- 
tionelle, politische und kulturelle Zusammenhänge 
eingebettet sind, wie sie entstehen und wie sich ihre 
gesellschaftlichen Kontexte verändern. Das Institut 
schlägt eine Brücke zwischen Theorie und Politik und 
leistet einen Beitrag zur politischen Diskussion über 
zentrale Fragen moderner Gesellschaften.
The Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies 
conducts advanced basic research on the governance 
of modern societies. It aims to develop an empirically 
based theory of the social and political foundations  
of modern economies by investigating the interrelation 
between economic, social and political action. Using 
primarily an institutional approach, it examines how 
markets and business organizations are embedded 
in historical-institutional, political and cultural 
frameworks, how they develop, and how their social 
contexts change over time. The institute seeks to build 
a bridge between theory and policy and to contribute 
to political debate on major challenges facing modern 
societies.
